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Through a comparative study of the UK and Spain, this paper addresses the 
effect of different governance systems and administrative practices on the 
functioning and role of research evaluation. It distinguishes three main evaluation 
functions: learning, distributive and accountability. In the UK, a flexible research 
management structure can respond to evaluation outcomes, and the three 
functions of evaluation co-exist in a diversified, decentralized, evaluation system. 
Despite rhetorical similarities, the Spanish evaluation system is dominated by its 
accountability functions, often playing the role of an audit system, and is mainly 
the responsibility of specialized evaluation agencies. These differences affect the 
way in which “evaluation” is understood in both countries. They cannot be 
attributed to a differential development in “evaluation cultures”, but rather to 
different research governance systems affecting the nature and scope of 
evaluation practice. 
Introduction 
The role of evaluation within the policy process depends on the administrative 
system within which the evaluation practices are inserted. Although this point has 
long been recognized its implications for evaluation policy learning and practice 
are often overlooked. In the late 1980s a comparative study observed that the 
ways in which evaluation was approached in different countries “reflected” their 
political and administrative culture (Gibbons & Georghiou, 1987). Reporting on 
another comparative set of studies Georghiou attributed the differences to three 
different factors: (1) the state of development of the research infrastructure, (2) 
the ways in which science is organized, and (3) the general practices of 
governance beyond the research domain (Georghiou, 1995, p. 4). In the study on 
Spain that constituted part of this comparative effort, Sanz-Menéndez argued 
that “the evolution of research evaluation activities or practices could be viewed 
as embedded in the institution for governance of the R&D system and in the 
general characteristics of the system for making public policy” (Sanz-Menéndez, 
1995, p. 80). The ways in which different governments have tried to manage 
public science through the introduction of different evaluation systems, and how 
the resulting governance structures affect scientific production have been the 
object of some research (Whitley & Glässer, 2007).  
 
Yet, most evaluation literature focuses on discussing the different approaches to 
evaluation on their own merits, as if they were, in practice, independent from the 
administrative context where evaluation takes place. The debates about the 
functions of evaluation and the degree to which concepts like “formative” and 
“summative” provide a useful classification of evaluation types seem to assume 
implicitly that evaluation is in the driving seat; that is, that the form of evaluation 
we adopt will define the nature of the policy process in which evaluation is 
inserted. Furthermore, it is at times specifically argued that countries progress 
through different evaluation culture stages, evolving towards increasingly 
sophisticated evaluation practice (Toulemonde, 2000). This approach carries with 
it a simple “policy learning” message: countries with comparatively lesser 
experience of evaluation should follow the practices of the countries that enjoy a 
more developed evaluation culture.  
This message is often translated into practice: countries that are relatively 
newcomers to the field of evaluation are importing evaluation methodologies, and 
their accompanying foreign experts and consultants to help them develop and 
implement evaluation strategies. Little consideration seems to be paid to the 
political and administrative framework within which evaluation takes place, and to 
the extent to which differences in political administration influence the practice of 
evaluation. It is stated that countries like Spain are lagging in its evaluation 
culture, and such lag is attributed to the dearth of evaluation experience, the lack 
of formal training in evaluation for professionals and civil servants, and the lack of 
formally established evaluation standards (Bustelo, 2006).  
This paper reconnects with the line of comparative research that more than a 
decade ago linked research evaluation practice with the broader research 
governance structure. The paper first reviews how the literature has discussed 
the different types and functions of evaluation, and settles on three different 
functions of evaluation that we will use to compare research evaluation practice.  
It then shows how academic research1 evaluation practice in the UK and Spain 
focus on different functions; in fact, although the term “evaluation” is used in all 
contexts it refers to very different activities. The final section discusses how these 
activities fit within the different systems of research governance. It is therefore 
misleading to speak of an “evaluation culture” as if this was an independent 
variable that we can develop without reference to broader governance issues.  
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 By academic research I refer to research carried out mainly in Higher Education Institutions and other 
Public Sector Research Establishments with the main objective of expanding the knowledge base. 
As concepts gain popularity they often lose precision. “Evaluation” is no stranger 
to this problem: the concept can be used to refer to very different types of 
practice. A standard dictionary definition will equate evaluation with “valuation”. 
The American Heritage Dictionary, for instance, defines evaluation as 
ascertaining the value of something. Scriven, one of the doyens of evaluation 
theory, has defined evaluation as “the process of determining the merit, worth 
and value of things, and evaluations are the product of that process” (Scriven, 
1991, p. 1). But this is extremely broad. It includes both formal, structured inquiry 
and informal assessment without the support of explicit criteria. Neither does this 
definition address the objective of evaluation. Evaluation analysts have narrowed 
the definition to apply it specifically to the task of professional evaluators; that is, 
the evaluation of public policy interventions. Rich defined evaluation as “the 
process of assessing whether or not desired or undesired outcomes have been 
reached, of specifying or explaining the outcomes that were reached, and of 
suggesting new strategies and/or definitions of future problems” (Rich, 1979, p. 
10). There are two aspects to note in this definition. First it implicitly refers to 
specific policy interventions. Second, it introduces the notion that one of the 
goals of evaluation is to contribute to future policy formation by, for instance, 
“suggesting new strategies”. Further, in the same book, Rich argues that a critical 
function of evaluation is to contribute to organizational learning (Rich, 1979, p. 
80). These traits are further reinforced by Chen´s notion of “programme 
evaluation” as “the application of evaluation approaches, techniques, and 
knowledge to systematically assess and improve the planning, implementation, 
and effectiveness of programs” (Chen, 2005, p. 3). The focus is firmly placed on 
specific types of policy interventions (“programs”) and the goals of evaluation are 
defined as both assessment and improvement.  
Chen and Rich´s approaches coincide with those of many evaluation 
practitioners in placing the objective of policy learning squarely at the centre of 
what evaluations are supposed to be for. Yet, there are other traditional functions 
of evaluation. 
Evaluation can be conducted to ensure the accountability of those using public 
resources to provide goods and services to society. Evaluation for accountability 
will provide “an external assessment of the effectiveness, efficiency, value for 
money, and performance” of a policy or set of policies (Batterbury, 2006, p. 182). 
Accountability-oriented evaluations are a tool of democratic scrutiny over the 
organizations and individuals using public funds to implement public policies. 
Evaluation can also be carried out as a tool to help distribute resources or 
rewards among policy implementers and beneficiaries. In such “distributive 
function” (Cruz-Castro & Sanz-Menéndez, 2008) the allocation of resources is 
decided according to the merit that the evaluation attributes to different 
individuals. Ex-ante project evaluation would be one example of such distributive 
type of evaluation, another being the use of evaluations to distribute rewards to 
individuals or groups that have performed according to some pre-established 
criteria. 
This paper will therefore distinguish between the learning, accountability and 
distributive functions of evaluation,2 arguing that, although it is possible for 
different functions to be combined within a single evaluation, in practice the 
different functions translate into different approaches to evaluation and its 
organization. I will illustrate this by comparing the British and Spanish 
approaches to academic research evaluation. 
Research evaluation in a comparative perspective 
Research Evaluation in the UK: a multifunctional perspective  
We can distinguish two main sources of research funding: (1) core funding 
supporting academic research for the long-term and granting academics high 
degree of freedom in the selection of research topics, and (2) project funding for 
clearly defined, time-bounded specific research initiatives. In the UK, core 
funding of research activities is organized through a formula-based approach that 
allocates money to universities according to their past research performance. 
The formula is based on the rating that the university departments achieve in the 
“Research Assessment Exercise” (RAE) (now being replaced by the Research 
Evaluation Framework -REF) and the number of academic staff involved in the 
assessment.3 Therefore, core funding is organized at the institutional level and is 
only assured for a period of years until the following evaluation exercise. The 
RAE (and now the REF) are the core evaluation activities in this process: and 
assessment of past research performance conducted for distributive purposes. 
The subjects of these evaluations are university departments through the 
RAE/REF system, and the process is managed by the Higher Education Funding 
Councils of the different British regions, who are in charge of defining and 
implementing the funding instruments. The specific assessments are 
commissioned to panels of academics, and occasionally other experts, who 
review the evidence presented by the University departments and their scientific 
production. The panels agree a rating for each of the units under review following 
a set of assessment criteria. The criteria, submissions and panel decisions are 
publicly available. This leads to a process that is both extensive (as it covers the 
whole of the English Higher Education system) and intensive (as each 
department’s report and the outputs it presents needs to be assessed, 
individually, by the assigned panel). The approach does not deploy an indicator-
based system of formal measurement, but so far has required a very large 
investment of resources.  
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 It must be noted that authors have identified other functions like legitimization and providing a forum for 
policy debate (Luukkonen, 2002, p. 84), or have used different terms and slightly different 
conceptualizations to refer to similar distinctions. See, for instance, Chen (1996) for a typology and an 
explicit critique of the most commonly used differentiation between formative and summative evaluations. 
3
 For detailed analysis of the RAE operation, consequences and debates on their evolution see Barker 
(2007) and Martin & Whitley (2010). 
Project funding is managed mainly by the Research Councils, who use a variety 
of instruments, from individual doctoral grants to multi-million, multi-year research 
centers. A large share of these grants is used to fund personnel costs: council-
funded researchers contracted to carry out specific research projects are an 
important component of the British academic system. In this case again, the 
evaluation processes are controlled by the same organizations that are in charge 
of policy implementation; there are no specialized evaluation agencies.  
Ex-ante project appraisal and ex-post assessment of final reports is carried out 
through a peer review system organized by the Councils themselves. The 
reviewers´ comments tend to be detailed and are distributed to the applicants; 
some Councils allow applicants to respond with comments before a funding 
decision is made. 
In addition ex-post impact assessment are very important for learning and 
accountability purposes. Substantial ex-post evaluations focusing on the impacts 
of specific investments are often carried out under contract by specialist 
consultants. Research Councils UK (RCUK), an organization that brings together 
the main UK academic research funding organizations, has a “Performance and 
Evaluation Group” in charge of “providing strategic direction on all issues relating 
to evaluation and benchmarking including the evaluation of Science Budget 
investments in research, training, knowledge transfer, science and society 
activities and operational performance” (http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/aboutrcuk/ 
executivegroup/subgroups/pegroup.htm). Among other objectives the group 
seeks to coordinate the evaluation activities of the different Research Councils 
and share best practices. Within the Research Councils different groups are in 
charge of different evaluation tasks; thus, for instance, in the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC), ex-post evaluation is organized by the 
Research Evaluation Committee (REC).4 The REC commissions ex-post 
evaluations of its programs (targeted funding, for a period of a 5 or 10-year, of a 
number of interrelated research projects), centers (funding of a substantial group 
of researchers working on the same field over a period of 5 or 10 years), and 
independent research projects.5 The Research Councils have paid considerable 
attention to the development of evaluation research methodologies, which are 
generally based on building a detailed understanding of the processes through 
which impact takes place. For instance, a far from exhaustive review of reports 
and papers commissioned by a single Research Council (ESRC) yields well over 
a dozen of publications and reports that are either methodological reflections or 
evaluations that include novel methodological development as part of their remit 
(Caswill, 1994; Cave & Hanney, 1996; Davies, Nutley, & Walter, 2005; Faulkner, 
1995; LaFollette, 1995; J. Molas-Gallart & Tang, 2007; J. Molas-Gallart, Tang, P., 
Sinclair, T., Morrow, S., Martin, B., 1999; Nutley, 2005; Redclift & Shore, 1995; 
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 Similarly the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council has a “Performance and Evaluation 
Team” operating along similar lines to REC. 
5
 Naturally each specific project, program or centre is, in addition, subjected to peer review assessment at 
the proposal stage and, once completed, to assess the final report. 
Rip & van der Meulen, 1995; Tang, Sinclair, Holmes, Wallace, & Hobday, 1998; 
Tuck, 1995; Whiston, 1990; Wooding, et al., 2007). The results of these 
evaluations are publicly available. 
In short, evaluation of academic research investments is devolved to the 
organizations in charge of policy implementation and is carried out in a 
decentralized manner: mainly by academic peers for project appraisals and often 
by independent paid consultants for ex-post impact assessment. As a 
consequence, a competitive evaluation marketplace has evolved with a number 
of consultancy companies and university groups and departments actively 
providing evaluation services to the Councils.6 
The UK research evaluation system plays, through its different processes and 
tools, all three main evaluation functions. Evaluation processes directly linked to 
the management of research resources have mainly distributive functions. Ex-
post evaluations to assess the impacts of research investments and the process 
through which such impacts take place have policy learning and accountability 
functions; the ex-post impact assessments carried out by the Research Councils 
seek to acquire information on impact processes and to use this information to 
inform the design of research support and exploitation tools. Inasmuch as they 
identify social value attributable to the research investments, they play an 
accountability role as well.  
The learning function is also present in the traditional assessment routines 
associated with research management. Although the peer review of project 
proposals is part and parcel or the normal administration of research funding 
organizations, in the UK peer reviews tend to be detailed assessments of the 
proposals and they are always distributed to the researchers. Although their 
primary function is to support decisions on the allocation of funds, the 
researchers can use the information they receive from the assessments to derive 
lessons for future proposals.  
Research evaluation in Spain: the persisting dominance of the accountability 
function 
The Spanish research system is characterized by the prominence of core funding 
channeled through the salaries of individual tenured academics. A percentage of 
the working time of tenured lecturers is assumed to be invested in research (and 
therefore accounted in the official R&D statistics as government R&D 
expenditure). In addition, the central Government funds several Public Research 
Establishments, the most important of which, the Spanish Council for Scientific 
Research (CSIC), 7 employs some 2200 full time researchers organized in a 
plethora of research groups and institutes. Core funding for these institutes is 
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 Similar characteristics have been identified by Feller (2003) for the US system. 
7
 Unlike the homonymous British “Research Councils”, CSIC is a research performing government 
organization until recently dependent from the Ministry of Education and recently converted into an 
Agency. As a research organization CSIC is closer to the French CNRS or the Italian CNR. 
composed of the salaries of their tenured staff and a related overhead 
component. 
Spanish research project funding revolves around the National R&D Plan. This is 
managed by a single agency, the National Agency for Evaluation and 
Prospective (ANEP). National Plan funding is distributed among a large number 
of university and CSIC groups and tends to fund marginal costs and junior 
doctoral grants associated with research projects: it is very rare for a National 
Plan project to fund the salaries of senior researchers, who are almost always 
tenured academics within the Spanish system.8  
In contrast with the United Kingdom, Spanish research evaluation is managed 
through specialized evaluation agencies. The National Agency for Evaluation and 
Prospective (ANEP) is in charge of organizing the peer review evaluation of 
research proposals submitted to the National Plan and the review of the projects´ 
interim and final reports. It therefore focuses on the project component of the 
funding system and plays a purely distributive function. The system is shaped by 
the large throughput of proposals and individual assessments that need to be 
dealt with a “weak bureaucracy” (Cruz-Castro & Sanz-Menéndez, 2008) 
managing very limited resources given the size of the task at hand.9 Their 
evaluations are necessarily cursory and the reviewers comments are not 
forwarded to the applicants: the interaction between applicants, managing 
agency and peer reviewers is kept at a minimum. The decisions and 
assessments that are conveyed to applicant and project-holders are very 
succinct,10 and no correspondence will typically be entered between researcher 
and reviewer. The reviewing process provides very little information to the 
applicants as to how to improve the project in the future and, therefore, does not 
play a learning function. 
Another agency, the “National Commission for the Evaluation of Research 
Activity” (better known by its Spanish acronym CNEAI) is in charge of 
implementing a system by which all Spanish tenured academics can submit, 
every six years, evidence of the results of their research activity. If the 
Commission deems that the proof submitted (crucially a list of the five most 
relevant publications of the period) constitute evidence that the individual has 
been research active, it awards a “sexenio”: an official confirmation of research 
activity that carries with it a modest increase in salary for the rest of her life and 
into her pensions (which in Spain is earnings-related). The main role of the 
Commission is to carry out this assessment and to this end it draws on a rotating 
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 In addition to central government funding, many Spanish regions have launched their own plans in 
support of research and innovation activities. These are managed by regional agencies and vary in 
organization, objectives and funding from region to region. In general, however, they fund research 
projects along similar lines and conditions to those implemented through the National Plan. 
9
 ANEP is led by seconded academics and has a very lean core organization. 
10
 For instance, referees´ comments on proposals are not conveyed to the applicants. 
staff of academics appointed for a fix period to these functions.11 The process by 
which “sexenios” are granted and the role played by CNEAI in this processes, 
emerges as the main mechanism for the ex-post evaluation of Spanish tenured 
researchers; in other words, it is the main evaluation tool for the core component 
of Spanish research funding.  
The resources at CNEAI´s disposal to assess thousands of academics every 
year are, again, very limited. Consequently, its decisions are driven by sets of 
“indicators” that are narrower than the official assessment criteria. The CNEAI 
assessment system focuses, in practice, on the number of journal articles 
published in ISI-listed journals and other academic publications preferably in 
foreign-language scholarly books and journals. There are thresholds that the 
individual aspiring to obtain a “sexenio” must pass and individual assessment of 
the quality of the publications is effectively precluded by the lack of resources. 
Finally, CNEAI communicates its decision to the individual in a terse manner: a 
phrase justifying the decision is accompanied by a long paragraph explaining 
how the academic can seek redress and the legal basis for this process 
(specifically 3 legal articles from two different pieces of legislation, stemming 
from two different ministries). The way in which the decision is communicated 
emphasizes the administrative nature of the process, which in practice is 
converted into an auditing process. The system has become an auditing 
mechanism to confirm the authenticity of the claims submitted by the academics; 
a system of incentives designed to play a distributive function has become a 
process to reinforce accountability from tenured academics. 
Importantly, the CNEAI system focuses on individual researchers, and the ANEP 
focuses its attention on the appraisal of individual research proposals and the 
auditing of ongoing projects. The importance of individual evaluations, instead of 
organizational ones, has been identified as one of the cardinal traits of the 
Spanish system of evaluation (Cruz-Castro & Sanz-Menéndez, 2008). The 
evaluation of structured interventions (as, for instance, of a research “plan” 
funding a large number of projects) has been limited to some attempts by 
regional authorities,12 and the evaluation of CSIC research institutes and centers 
carried out under the CSIC programming process. 
Since the mid 2000s, CSIC has rolled out another evaluation system: an ex-ante 
assessment of institute-level strategic research programs, which also takes into 
account past research performance. The whole organization develops every four 
years a strategic plan is informed by the plans that each formally recognized 
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 Detailed descriptions and assessments of the “sexenios” system can be found in (2008); and (Jiménez-
Contreras, de Moya Anegón, & López-Cózar, 2003) 
12
 Outside the central government agencies some regional governments have set up their own organizations 
to discharge similar functions within their own regions. In particular many regions have developed their 
own Science and Technology Plans, and other programs to support research activities. In some cases, 
project selection is contracted out to the ANEP, but some regions have built their own evaluation agencies, 
which in some cases are broadening their work beyond project evaluation to ex-post program evaluations 
and ex-ante policy definition studies.  
CSIC research group or institute has to develop. These plans are assessed by 
committees of foreign peer reviewers that can suggest changes to the objectives 
and targets defined in the plans. Therefore, the evaluation appears, on the face 
of it, to play a learning role: plans are presented and discussed with the 
evaluation panel and the Institutes have to respond to the comments made by 
the reviewers. Formally, the agreed strategic plan sets objectives for the groups 
and establishes a plan for the transfer of resources (importantly tenured 
positions) to these groups to carry out their agreed strategies. In practice, 
however, the approved strategic plans do not amount to a commitment for any of 
the participating “partners” (central CSIC administration and research groups and 
institutes), and there is no established mechanism to follow the implementation of 
its recommendations. What remains, however, is a limited set of annual 
quantitative targets (publications, funding raised,…) against which the groups are 
measured every year and if deemed successful their employees receive a small 
productivity bonus. What had been designed as an evaluation strategy with a 
strong learning function has become another auditing system for accountability 
backed up by a weak distributive tool in the shape of an economic incentive. 
The 2008 National R&D Plan made reference to the latest newcomer to the 
Spanish research evaluation system: the establishment of an “Integral Monitoring 
and Evaluation System” (SISE in its Spanish acronym). Originally an initiative 
launched by the Spanish Foundation for Science and Technology (FECYT)13 to 
monitor the National Plan and other research programs it is yet to be turned into 
an explicit structured approach, let alone an evaluation “tool”. Yet it is worth 
noting how the National Plan describes SISE´s objectives: 
“The Integral Monitoring and Evaluation System (SISE) is the tool designed for 
management control of all public programs in support of R&D&I, to improve 
transparency and the publicity given to all interventions, so that the citizens and 
the Spanish society can be informed about the activities that are being supported 
with public funds” (my translation of the Spanish version available at 
www.plannacionalidi.es/gestion/seguimiento.php )  
This paragraph is clear in determining the main function allocated to the fledgling 
system: the SISE is a monitoring tool to provide control and accountability of 
public actions. It is therefore apparent that the learning function is neither an 
objective in current evaluation practice, nor is it included among the goals for the 
development of an evaluation system.14 
Evaluation and Governance 
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 The FECYT is a foundation dependent from the Ministry of Science and Innovation to support the 
Spanish innovation system through R&D, collaboration and dissemination activities.  
14
 Some ex-post program level evaluations have been conducted by regional authorities assessing the 
implementation of their own regional research plans. These could in principle perform a learning function 
but so far this has been precluded by their weak linkages with the policy process. The evaluations have 
tended to be ad-hoc ex post exercises with mainly a learning function which in practice have been limited 
to the direct commissioners of the study (evaluations are seldom published), and without a established 
feedback system into the policy process. 
The systems we have briefly reviewed in the preceding section are naturally 
complex. The UK and Spain are large countries with complex administrative 
structures implementing a variety of research policies. Evaluation strategies and 
practices can vary from actor to actor, and may combine different functions within 
a single evaluation strategy. Yet, the comparison of the UK and Spanish systems 
has exposed that they have little in common concerning the dominant practices 
and functions of research evaluation.  Perhaps the most relevant difference is in 
terms of what the Spanish approach to evaluation does not do. Unlike the UK, 
research evaluations in Spain do not, in the main, deal with program-based 
evaluations (a difference referring to “what” is being evaluated), seem 
unconcerned with the analysis of the processes through which effects take place 
(a difference in “how” evaluations are conducted) and do not attend to the 
learning function of evaluation (“why” evaluation is done differs). While the British 
system combines the three functions and pays attention to the development of 
approaches to further evaluation´s learning functions, the Spanish system 
focuses on accountability and distributive functions and operates as a complex 
system of administrative controls. 
How can we explain such differences? As we pointed out at the start of this 
paper, one can see the disparities as reflecting different stages in the 
development of evaluative practices. From this perspective, countries like the UK 
with longer experience in the implementation of policy evaluation have been able 
to deploy systems that allow its results to be fed back to stakeholders, thus 
developing its learning function. In comparison, the argument would continue, a 
country like Spain, where evaluation is a more recent practice, feedback 
processes and the learning function they support are yet to be developed. This 
argument is however based on a strong assumption: that evaluation practice can 
develop independently from administrative culture and that it is through changes 
in evaluation approaches that the administrative and overall governance systems 
can change. This is a tall order for a fledgling practice. 
As we have discussed at the start of this paper, there is an alternative view that 
stresses the links between evaluation practice and the governance system, 
including the dominant administrative culture. Here the assumption is that 
evaluation approaches cannot develop independently; on the contrary, they are 
explained by the administrative processes within which they are inserted. The 
variance in evaluation approaches can therefore be explained by the existence of 
different governance systems.  
An analysis of the two cases I have compared here suggests that the differences 
in research administration and governance can go a long way in explaining the 
diversity in evaluation practice. We can identify two key, interrelated, factors with 
a bearing on evaluation practice: the extent of tenured appointments within the 
academic system, and the role of project funding. Tenured appointments are not 
universal in the British academic system, often the reward to senior academics 
who have reached the rank of professor. Instead, it is common for even senior 
academics to derive a part of their salaries or their totality from research projects 
throughout extensive periods of their careers. The research project thus 
becomes a crucial tool to sustain the individual activity of many academics and to 
define research priorities and activities. Having to support salaries as well as all 
the other research costs, UK research grants have tended to be financially large 
in relation to the staff formally involved,15 and become an important determinant 
of research activity.16 Consequently, research activity tends to be project-based. 
Also, bigger sized projects mean a less fragmented portfolio of research 
activities: a relatively (to the size of the budget) lower throughput of proposals 
and projects, which can play a determinant role in the careers of academics and 
the overall profile of research activities. In this context, peer review (both of 
research proposals and final reports) and ex-post program evaluation are called 
to play a learning as well as distributive and accountability functions. Detailed 
peer reports are important for the development of future projects, and the lessons 
of previous research initiatives identified through program evaluations can be 
translated into new priorities and funding mechanisms with a rapid effect on the 
overall research strategy of the academic community. The importance of projects 
makes the system more flexible and responsive, and therefore the lessons 
derived from evaluation can be conveyed into practice with relative ease. 
The governance of academic research in Spain is very different from the situation 
I have just described for the United Kingdom. First, it is a system dominated by 
tenured appointments: most established academics are tenured public 
employees, working either for their public universities17 or for public research 
establishments like CSIC. Access to academic tenured jobs is regulated, as for 
any public servant, by standard bureaucratic controls administered centrally to 
ensure fair and equal access conditions. Further controls are established to 
implement a degree of accountability on the performance of the functions for 
which the scientists/public employees are responsible. These processes 
necessarily pose constraints to the ways in which academics can organize their 
activities. Hiring processes, in particular, are cumbersome and subject to multiple 
conditions. Consequently, the personnel structure of Spanish academia is very 
rigid. The system that emerges from these practices is difficult to adapt to the 
potential recommendations that could emerge from “formative” evaluation 
processes. Any recommendation that would point to a perceived necessity to 
incorporate new skills, or to change research priorities would be in practice 
difficult to implement, at least in the short term. 
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 Particularly if compared to those in countries, like Spain or Italy, where the majority of academic 
personnel is tenured. 
16
 “Core” research funding allocated through the Research Assessment Exercise is an important source of 
funding that is not linked to any specific research project or strategy. Yet the amounts of funding that 
universities receive through this channel are revised every 5 to 7 years. Currently funding is linked to the 
results of the Research Assessment Exercise, and a formula-based system is being developed for use in the 
future.  
17
 There are Spanish private universities but their relative importance is small except in some specific 
disciplines like business administration. 
Further, within this structure, the role of the research project is very different from 
the function that the same tool plays in the British case. Projects like those 
funded by the Spanish National R&D Plan and other academic research 
programs implemented by regional authorities and other organizations will only 
cover “marginal costs”: those additional costs attributable to the research activity. 
Direct salary costs are already covered by existing budgetary allocations (they 
are part of the “core funding” of Spanish research activities). Consequently, 
research projects will tend to be relatively small in financial terms,18 and, more 
importantly, as in many disciplines the majority of research resources are 
financed through “core funding” streams it is unlikely that academics will organize 
their activities on a project basis. In this situation it is more difficult to influence 
research agendas through changes in project funding programs.  
Altogether, the relative minor role of projects and the tenured status of research 
scientists combine to constitute a system that is not responsive to attempts to 
“fine tune” its management or to steer its priorities. The learning function of 
evaluation cannot be as effective as in a more flexible governance structure. 
Instead, the bureaucratic nature of the research management system calls for 
auditing and accountability mechanisms. It is not surprising that these are 
dominant in the Spanish approach to evaluation. 
This paper has therefore confirmed the insights of analysts that more than a 
decade ago were suggesting that national approaches to evaluation reflect local 
administrative culture and practice. By comparing two contrasting cases I have 
characterized these differences in terms, mainly, of the different functions that 
evaluation plays in different contexts. There is a clear policy implication that can 
be derived from this observation: to draw policy lessons on evaluation strategies 
from countries with different research governance structures will be ill-advised, 
unless these lessons are integrated within a broader strategy of administrative 
reform. 
Finally, and from a practical perspective, the differences we have identified are 
so profound that they lead to a different understanding of what “evaluation” 
means. The dominant notions of evaluation in the British context are aligned with 
current program evaluation practices emphasizing their learning function. In 
Spain, evaluation is dominantly seen as part of a broader system to ensure 
accountability and manage a resource allocation system; often no more than an 
administrative task. The increasingly common rhetoric with its calls to “strengthen 
evaluation” is likely to be interpreted very differently by communities of research 
policy practitioners in different countries. The potential for confusion lies in the 
fact that we may be assuming (incorrectly) that we are all speaking the same 
evaluation language.  
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 This situation varies across research fields. In areas like the social sciences where the need for 
laboratories and other research infrastructures is often small, successful projects will receive small 
contributions (for travel, empirical research costs, doctoral students assigned to the project). Areas, like 
many in the natural sciences where there is a need for research infrastructures may receive higher levels of 
project funding and this stream of resources may acquire higher strategic importance. 
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